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Abstract 
Current birth registration systems fail to serve adequately the interests of those born as a 
result of gamete and embryo donation and surrogacy. In the UK, changes to the birth 
registration system have been piecemeal, reactive and situation-specific and no information 
is recorded about gamete donors. Birth registration has thereby become a statement of legal 
parentage and citizenship only, without debate as to whether it should serve any wider 
functions. This sits uneasily with the increasingly accepted human right to know one’s 
genetic and gestational as well as legal parents, and the duty of the State to facilitate that 
right. This commentary sets out one possible model for reform to better ensure that those 
affected become aware of, and/or have access to, knowledge about their origins and that 
such information is stored and released effectively without compromising individual privacy. 
Among other features, our proposal links the birth registration system and the information 
stored in the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority’s Register of Information, 
although further work than we have been able to undertake here is necessary to ensure a 
better fit where cross-border treatment services or informal arrangements have been 
involved. The time for debate and reform is well overdue. 
Keywords: birth certificates, birth registration, donor conception, gamete donation, surrogacy 
 
The advent and increasing prevalence of gamete and embryo donation and surrogacy – or 
collaborative assisted reproduction – call into question the ability of the UK’s birth 
registration system to serve adequately the interests of those born as a result of such 
procedures. Although time has witnessed both policy shifts and legislative reform, these 
have been piecemeal, reactive and situation-specific. Wider debate about the purpose and 
significance of birth registration has been lacking, as in the White Paper Joint Birth 
Registration: Recording Responsibility (Department for Work and Pensions, 2008) which was 
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driven primarily by policy intentions to engage more unmarried genetic fathers in financial 
and other support for their children (for a useful summary see Clapton, 2014). In this 
commentary, we argue that systematic reform is now both necessary and achievable. 
The UK’s birth registration system retains much of its original mid-nineteenth century 
characteristics but has shown itself capable of adaptation, for example to take account of 
adoption, surrogacy arrangements, civil partnerships and re-registration for transgender 
individuals. It also enables paternity details to be altered, added or removed following the 
original registration (Bainham, 2008) including for donor-conceived individuals in limited 
circumstances (Crawshaw and Wallbank, 2014), and allows the posthumous naming of an 
intended parent (Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 2008). In the process, birth 
registration has become a record of citizenship and legal parentage alone, obscuring 
additional functions as a source of information about one’s progenitors through recording 
biological facts (Bainham, 2008) and as a public health record (Brumberg et al., 2012). While 
earlier records were not a guarantee that the named father was also the genetic parent, the 
law assumed this to be the case. Thus, it was a criminal offence for a husband to be 
registered as father if the registrant knew him not to be the genetic father, including where 
donor insemination had been used. When this offence was removed in the case of donor 
insemination in the 1987 Family Law Reform Act there was, again, no discussion about the 
implications of removing the record of assumed biological facts. 
For individuals conceived following donor-assisted reproduction, the birth registration 
system fails to record details of their genetic parents where one or both of these is a gamete 
donor or where multi-parenting arrangements prevail, for example where two female 
parents and a genetic father share child-rearing responsibilities. In our view this sits uneasily, 
first with increasingly accepted views that individuals should have the right to know their 
parents (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; European Convention on 
Human Rights). Although neither Convention is explicit in who should be defined as a parent, 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has frequently expressed a view that this 
should include gamete donors (Blyth and Farrand, 2004) while, in the UNICEF 
Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Hodgkin and Newell 
(2007) argue that this should include: 
genetic parents (for medical reasons alone this knowledge is of increasing importance to the 
child) and birth parents, that is the mother who gave birth and the father who claimed 
paternity through partnership with the mother at the time of birth (or whatever the social 
definition of father is within the culture). (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007: 105) 
Whilst acknowledging that terminology in collaborative assisted reproduction is complex and 
contested in its everyday use within and by the families and individuals affected, the 
principle for these purposes is therefore that ‘parents’ should include: 
 those with a linear genetic relationship to the child (i.e. the genetic ‘parents’ who 
may variously be the surrogate, the intending/commissioning ‘parents’ in a 
surrogacy arrangement, or an embryo or gamete donor); 
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 those who carried the pregnancy and gave birth even if they are not raising the child 
(i.e. the birth/gestational ‘parent’) 
 those raising the child or who are otherwise the child’s legal ‘parents’. 
Hodgkin and Newell (2007) state further that in relation to Article 8 of the UN Convention 
(‘right to identity’): 
The concept of ‘children’s identity’ has tended to focus on the child’s immediate family, but 
it is increasingly recognized that children have a remarkable capacity to embrace multiple 
relationships. From the secure foundation of an established family environment, children 
can enjoy complex and subtle relationships with other adults and with a range of cultures, to 
a much larger degree than may be recognized. Thus children’s best interests and senses of 
identity may be sustained without having to deny them knowledge of their origins, for 
example after reception into state care, through ‘secret’ adoptions or anonymous 
egg/sperm donations and so forth. (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007: 142). 
This is supported by research suggesting that for some donor-conceived individuals, their 
best interests and sense of identity may even be enhanced rather than threatened by having 
information about the donor, with or without any ongoing relationship (Blyth et al., 2012). 
Further, given that all these ‘parents’ are potentially significant to offspring throughout their 
lifetime – variously for medical reasons, to better understand their social, cultural and 
biographical heritage, to satisfy their curiosity, to complete their identity and so on–they 
arguably have the right to know them all (Blyth et al., 2009). 
Our second concern regarding the UK’s system lies in its incongruity with recent UK practice, 
policy and legislative developments. These promote the rights of individuals to discover 
information about genetic parents and others genetically related through gamete or embryo 
donation (including through surrogacy) via the Human Fertilization and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) registers and the government-funded DNA-based voluntary pre-1991 
Donor Conceived Register. The UK’s current birth registration system increases the 
likelihood that some of those individuals eligible to exercise these rights may never learn of 
their entitlement through the failure to allow it to be part of the machinery for meeting 
what we argue to be the State’s human rights obligations to record and provide full 
parentage information. 
The possibility of reforming birth registration is far from a novel concept. Almost a decade 
ago, a joint Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons: 
…. recognize[d] the force of the argument that the fact of donor conception should be 
registered on a person’s birth certificate. This would create the incentive for the parent(s) to 
tell the child of the fact of his or her donor conception and would go some way to address 
the value of knowledge of genetic history for medical purposes. Moreover, unlike where 
children are born through natural conception, assisted conception by its nature involves the 
authorities and we are deeply concerned about the idea that the authorities may be 
colluding in a deception. However, we also recognize that this is a complicated area involving 
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the important issue of privacy, as well as issues of human rights and data protection. We 
therefore recommend that, as a matter of urgency, the Government should give this matter 
further consideration (House of Lords and House of Commons Committee on the Human 
Tissue and Embryos [Draft] Bill, 2007: 276). 
Although the Committee’s sense of urgency has never been reflected in the policies 
promoted by the three subsequent administrations (Labour 2007–2010; Coalition 2010–
2015; Conservative 2015–present), other jurisdictions, such as Argentina, British Columbia 
(Canada), New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland and Victoria (Australia), have done so. These 
have introduced formal changes to take account of collaborative assisted conception and the 
reality that a child may have more than two parents (as defined above), while individual 
court cases resulting in similar outcomes have been reported in Florida and changes are 
actively under consideration in Germany, South Australia and New South Wales (Australia). 
These developments are discussed in more detail by Rundle and Hardy (2012), Allan (2016) 
and Collins (2016). Pressure is also growing in the UK and internationally from donor-
conceived and adopted people (see for example Coalition for Accurate Birth Records 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1697052370542414; Kramer 2015). 
Although reforms in other jurisdictions have been implemented too recently to provide any 
real policy or practice guidance, we nevertheless consider that that birth registration reform 
is feasible in the UK. We acknowledge that it should ensure that: 
 individual privacy is not compromised 
 any additional bureaucracy is proportionate 
 any additional public expense is proportionate. 
Key to any reform is effective linking of the registration systems of the HFEA and the three 
UK General Register Offices (GRO). Most radically this could be achieved by transferring the 
HFEA’s responsibilities for keeping relevant Register information to the GRO – as occurred 
(temporarily) in Victoria where the ill-fated transfer of the Infertility Treatment Authority’s 
Register to Births, Deaths and Marriages has recently been reversed. 
If separate HFEA and GRO registration systems were retained, it should be possible to 
institute effective collaboration to enable links to be made between GRO records and the 
HFEA Register of Information. Below, we set out one possible model, building on previous 
proposals advanced by Blyth et al. (2009), PROGAR (2012) and the Birth Registration 
Campaign (2013). 
 Whenever the HFEA is notified of a donor-conceived birth (including where 
surrogacy arrangements were involved) either by a parent or by a treating clinic, this 
information is provided to the GRO. 
 The GRO notes a link between its own birth registration and HFEA records and 
informs the parent(s) (here we mean those raising the child or who subsequently 
become the legal parents) in writing that this is in place. 
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 The format of all birth certificates regardless of whether or not the individual is 
donor-conceived or born following a surrogacy arrangement, is annotated to make 
clear that it is a certificate of legal parentage only and that further information may 
be available about genetic and gestational parentage (we explain this in more detail 
below). The exact details to be included on such a certificate will require further 
debate. 
 When an application is made to the GRO either for a birth record or to see if any 
additional information is available and the GRO is satisfied that the applicant is the 
individual to whom the information relates or his or her legal parent – and those 
persons only – the GRO will indicate to the applicant that the HFEA has information 
regarding the conception. 
 If the individual then chooses to contact the HFEA, the measures that exist with 
regard to applications to the HFEA Register will come into operation (i.e. age limits 
relating to information disclosure and the provision of counselling). 
 Arrangements for releasing information to anyone with a Parental Order in place 
continue as now. 
The provision of information and advice concerning birth registration to persons undergoing 
a donor or surrogacy procedure would become mandatory as part of the responsibilities of 
licensed treatment centres and specified as such in the HFEA Code of Practice. 
The situation is undoubtedly more complex where donor-assisted treatment services have 
been provided overseas or through informal arrangements in the UK or overseas. Further 
discussion is required about the feasibility of linking GRO systems to overseas systems where 
they exist. For intended/commissioning parents in surrogacy arrangements there could be a 
requirement to supply such information as is available to them as part of a Parental Order 
application. There could also be the facility for anyone who has used either informal 
arrangements or overseas treatment to voluntarily submit the information that they hold to 
the GRO. 
Privacy concerns can be addressed by recognizing that the ‘background’ information of 
those born following third party assisted conception merits ‘special treatment’ by not being 
accessible to public inspection or search. There is precedent here through restrictions on 
public access to the Parental Order Register (for births resulting from a surrogacy 
arrangement), the Adopted Children Register, the Stillbirth Register and the Gender 
Recognition Register. We suggest that there should be informed debate as to whether any 
restrictions should be lifted following the person’s death, for example to enable those 
wishing to identify genetic as well as legal forebears or for other historical research 
purposes. 
Finally, and importantly, we suggest that there are no good reasons for retaining the current 
‘short’ and ‘long’ birth certificates to which all UK citizens are entitled – and perhaps not 
even the current Parental Order and Adoption certificates. One certificate – called a 
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certificate of legal parentage or similar – could be introduced for all official purposes which 
shows the date on which it is issued (storing the original certificate in the case of adoption, 
surrogacy and so on). This should include a statement that it is a record of legal parentage 
only and that information about any additional records concerning genetic and/or 
gestational parentage will be provided on request. The GRO would then be required to 
inform any enquirers as to where any additional information is available and either supply it 
or signpost to the relevant agency, whichever applies. They would need to make clear that: 
(i) where surrogacy was involved then a gamete donor may also have been used; and (ii) that 
where the enquirer had been born overseas or through informal arrangements then 
information may be lacking. The GRO should also advise enquirers not to assume their legal 
parents are their genetic or gestational parents if additional information is not available. 
Annotation of the birth certificate itself to make explicit donor conception provides the most 
direct form of certification for donor-conceived people. However, given the wide-ranging 
purposes for which a birth certificate is used and the range of individuals and organisations 
requesting sight of one for identification purposes, such an overt disclosure poses privacy 
risks to both donor-conceived people and to their parents. This further strengthens the 
argument for the introduction of a certificate of legal parentage for all citizens, including not 
only donor-conceived people but also those who are adopted and surrogate-born. 
Annotation of the birth certificate itself may also prove self-defeating if it led to reduced 
levels of disclosure by recipient parents or increased their recourse to services overseas in 
order to avoid using this system (Blyth et al., 2009). Further research and debate is needed 
to consider how great a risk this may be. However, we are not persuaded by opposition to 
reform on the grounds that the decision for disclosure should remain a private family matter 
– in other words parental discretion – and that the State therefore carries no responsibilities 
beyond allowing access to the HFEA Register (Nuffield, 2013). 
In summary, we believe that this proposal should receive detailed consideration. It 
safeguards privacy rights so that no-one other than the donor-conceived person or his or her 
legal parents will be able to access information disclosing the donor-conceived person’s 
status. It would not establish any provisions that are different from current provisions for 
public access to birth records that would alert an enquirer who is not the donor-conceived 
person him/herself to the possibility of donor-conception and avoids setting up a completely 
separate registration system. It does involve additional resources insofar as the GRO and the 
HFEA will have to establish systems for the recording of this new information. However, the 
limited numbers of individuals involved indicate that any such resource requirements are 
proportionate. 
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